database_query passed model-written SQL straight to a connection that commits. The
corpus reaches the model's context, and in a parliament anyone able to speak can get
text into the corpus, so that SQL has to be treated as untrusted input.
Two layers now apply. Statements must begin with SELECT or WITH, and multi-statement
payloads are rejected — that is how a write gets smuggled in behind a leading SELECT.
Then the query runs inside SET TRANSACTION READ ONLY, so PostgreSQL rejects writes
itself even if the first check is wrong. Verified both independently: five attack
shapes refused by the guard, and INSERT/DROP still refused when the guard is bypassed
entirely and the database layer is called directly.
share_insight gets the same treatment. It re-executes SQL stored in saved
conversations, which is no more trustworthy than freshly generated SQL.
Neither layer replaces running against a SELECT-only role, and SECURITY.md still says
so — it now describes what the application does rather than what it fails to do.
Tool rename completed as a clean break, no aliases, since there are three users and
six sessions to preserve: arango_search -> search_speeches (it has queried Postgres
since the Arango migration and the name was pure debt), search_motions ->
search_documents, fetch_motion -> fetch_document.
Also renamed fetch_documents -> fetch_speeches. It fetches speeches despite the name,
and sitting next to the new fetch_document it was a trap the model would fall into.
Note for anyone with an MCP client configured against the old names: riksdagen_mcp
exposes these, so the names it advertises have changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lasse Edfast
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