database_query passed model-written SQL straight to a connection that commits. The
corpus reaches the model's context, and in a parliament anyone able to speak can get
text into the corpus, so that SQL has to be treated as untrusted input.
Two layers now apply. Statements must begin with SELECT or WITH, and multi-statement
payloads are rejected — that is how a write gets smuggled in behind a leading SELECT.
Then the query runs inside SET TRANSACTION READ ONLY, so PostgreSQL rejects writes
itself even if the first check is wrong. Verified both independently: five attack
shapes refused by the guard, and INSERT/DROP still refused when the guard is bypassed
entirely and the database layer is called directly.
share_insight gets the same treatment. It re-executes SQL stored in saved
conversations, which is no more trustworthy than freshly generated SQL.
Neither layer replaces running against a SELECT-only role, and SECURITY.md still says
so — it now describes what the application does rather than what it fails to do.
Tool rename completed as a clean break, no aliases, since there are three users and
six sessions to preserve: arango_search -> search_speeches (it has queried Postgres
since the Arango migration and the name was pure debt), search_motions ->
search_documents, fetch_motion -> fetch_document.
Also renamed fetch_documents -> fetch_speeches. It fetches speeches despite the name,
and sitting next to the new fetch_document it was a trap the model would fall into.
Note for anyone with an MCP client configured against the old names: riksdagen_mcp
exposes these, so the names it advertises have changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
talks -> speeches ("talks" reads as conference talks to everyone outside this
project), motions -> documents with a new doc_type column so bills, written
questions and committee reports can share the table later, and 79 columns from
anforandetext -> text, intressent_id -> person_id, valkrets -> constituency,
lydelse -> text, and so on.
_postgres/rename_map.py is the single source of truth. The migration, its rollback,
and the code rewrite are all derived from it, so they cannot drift apart. Hand-
writing a rollback is how you end up with one that fails halfway through.
Two identifiers could not be renamed mechanically and were done by reading the
queries: dok_id means the protocol document in talks but the primary key in
motions, and year stays a calendar year in speeches while becoming session_year in
documents. The latter is aliased in SQL so the JSON field stays `year` and the
frontend contract is unchanged.
Values are never translated. Bifall and Avslag stay as published; parliament.yaml
glosses them. A research tool must not silently rewrite the record.
The migration is guarded by an existence check, so the same file is a no-op on a
fresh database and does the work on an existing one — one schema definition in the
world. ALTER TABLE ... RENAME is catalog-only, so the millions of HNSW-indexed
vectors are untouched.
The trigger functions are recreated explicitly, because plpgsql bodies are stored
as opaque text and do not follow renames: they would have compiled fine and then
failed at the next INSERT. They now read the text-search config from a database
setting rather than hardcoding 'swedish'.
Verified: migration round-trips to a byte-identical schema across columns, indexes
and triggers; re-running is a no-op; triggers repopulate search_vector with working
Swedish stemming on INSERT and UPDATE; and the renamed code runs real searches
against a migrated database holding 5,000 rows of production data, with plain,
prefix and exclusion syntax all working. Frontend type errors went from 9 to 7 —
the rename fixed two and introduced none.
Not yet done, and tracked: legacy compatibility views, the shim for SQL replayed
from saved snapshots, tool-name aliases, and updating docs to the new names.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seeded via an explicit allow-list (see /home/lasse/plenum-seed.sh) rather than by
deleting files from a copy, so nothing sensitive can survive by omission.
Excluded: WireGuard backup + client config, the plaintext DB password in admin.py,
Arango credentials in scripts/notes.md, .claude/settings.json, a 113 MB log,
providers.yaml (private endpoint), the Arango/ChromaDB-era scripts, the duplicated
claude-design-system frontend copy, and assorted screenshots and one-off planning docs.
297 tracked files / 49 MB of history -> 161 files / 2.1 MB.
Recovered 14 database migrations that the old .gitignore's `*.sql` rule had been
hiding from version control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lasse Edfast